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In 1997 the new Labour government in the UK inherited a situation where nearly one in 5 children 
lived in a household where no adult worked and around one in 3 lived in relative poverty. Children had 
replaced pensioners as the poorest group in society. The incoming government set about an ambitious 
set of reforms deigned to reduce poverty and worklessness amongst families with children. This policy 
reform agenda contained some features akin to the welfare reform process being undertaken in the US 
since 1996. But with one fundamental difference, that welfare payments to jobless families rose rapidly 
and there is no time restriction in access to these payments. This paper describes the key features of the 
welfare reform process and documents the reforms to welfare payments and in particular contrasts them 
with the US system. The results show that the reformed UK welfare support system, taxes and benefits, 
for children is more generous to low-income families with children but less for better off families. So 
the UK system is more progressive among families with children. The paper goes on to look at the 
emerging evidence of the impact of the UK policy reform process on poverty and welfare dependence. 
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Introduction 
 ‘‘Our historic aim will be for ours to be the first generation to end child poverty.’’ 
 (Tony Blair, Beveridge Lecture, 1999) 
Perhaps the most ambitious commitment made by the current Labour Government in the UK is its stated intention to eliminate 
child poverty within a generation—defined as 20 years.  In this chapter we discuss the Government’s motivation for this initiative, 
what the Government means when it talks about child poverty, and the welfare reform strategy developed to achieve it.  We then 
discuss what the reform package has accomplished so far.  We follow  this with a look at future developments the Government 
has announced or proposed but not yet implemented.  We conclude with a short discussion of what we see as the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Labour program. 
Motivation 
We do not address here the factors leading up to and influencing Labour’s child poverty initiative.  Rather we  concentrate on the 
economic and social evidence on which the Government bases its commitment.  This evidence falls into three parts: how the 
changing British economy has affected the ability of working-age adults to secure incomes above poverty levels, the particularly 
stark deterioration in the circumstances of Britain’s children relative to other groups, and the mounting evidence that deprivation in 
childhood adversely affects a person’s long-term outlook.  The importance attached to this evidence is apparent in a number of 
Treasury publications, in particular analyses of developments in the labour market (HM Treasury, 1997), the problems of inactive 
workers (HM Treasury, 2001), and poverty dynamics and life-chances (HM Treasury, 1999a). 
The Changing Economy 
Of the many changes in the British social economy over the past two decades that have affected the ability of working-age adults 
to secure incomes above poverty levels, four are particularly important: (1) growth in workless households, (2) increased earnings 
inequality, (3) reduced earnings mobility, and (4) an increased wage loss from spells of unemployment.   
(1) Britain has one of the highest employment rates among developed nations, with 75 percent of working age  adults in work (a 
fraction below that in the US).  Although this aggregate employment rate has been pretty stable, the share of households with at 
least one working age adult but no one employed has grown sharply, from 8 percent in 1979 to 17 percent in 2000 (Gregg and   3
Wadsworth, 1996 and 2002a).  The latter compares with around 10 percent in the US (Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth, 2002).  
Over the same period, the number of UK households where all adults are in work has increased.  About a quarter of this rising 
gap is due to a relative increase in single adult households, with the rest due to a polarization of work that produces both more 
workless and more fully employed households (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2002a).   
(2) Among developed nations over the period 1979 to 1995, the UK was second only to the US in its absolute increase in the 
ratio of the 90th earning percentile to the 10th (OECD, 1996).  Male wage inequality continued to grow in the UK between 1990 
and 1996, but at a slower rate than in the 1980s.  Since 1996 wage inequality has changed little (Tables A28 - A33, Office of 
National Statistics, 2000; for more detail and interpretation, see Machin, 1999; or Gosling, Machin and Meghir, 2000).  
(3) The extent of mobility up and down the UK earnings distribution has fallen sharply since the late 1970.  For example, 29 
percent of men in the second lowest earnings decile in 1979 were still there a year later.  By 1988, this measure of earnings 
persistence had risen to 37 percent (Dickens, 1999, p 218), and it has been broadly stable since.   
(4) On average, men who lose jobs and take up unemployment-related benefits return to work on, and remain at, lower wages 
than in their previous jobs.  The past two decades in the UK have seen this wage loss grow (Nickell et al, 1999; Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 2000a).  What is more, job loss is not evenly distributed across the labour force.  For example, the lowest paid tenth 
of men are twice as likely not to be earning a year after a job loss as are those in the middle of the earnings distribution (Dickens, 
1999).   
Taken together, these four trends suggest that lifetime earnings inequality may have risen even faster than the inequality evident in 
conventional cross-sectional measures.  In addition, reductions in income tax rates and a failure to increase welfare benefits in line 
with average real incomes have further increased after-tax income inequality (Johnson and Webb, 1993; Clark and Leicester, 
forthcoming).  These developments have contributed to a general increase in poverty in the UK, with growth in poverty among 
children especially marked.  
Income Poverty and Worklessness in Households with Children  
Over the last twenty years, children have replaced pensioners as the poorest group in UK society.  While average incomes among 
elderly households, even among the poorest fifth, have risen in real terms, the poorest fifth of children in 1996/7 were in   4
households with real incomes no higher than those of the corresponding group in 1979 (Gregg, Harkness and Machin, 1999).  
Poverty during childhood—defined, following traditional UK practice, as household income less than 50 percent of the national 
mean—is now almost evenly split between in-work poverty (an earner in the household) and workless poverty (no working adult 
present). 1  In 1996/7, nearly 20 percent of UK children lived in households where no adult worked, up from 7 percent in 1979 
and 4 percent in 1968.  Ninety percent of these children were in poor households, creating a large spike in the income distribution 
substantially below the poverty line.  
The UK, at 20 percent, has a substantially higher share of children living in workless households compared with other developed 
nations.  The country with the next worst record in 1996 was Ireland, at 15 percent.  In all other European countries the share of 
children in workless households in 1996 was 11 percent or less (OECD, 1998, p 12).  Even before the current emphasis on 
getting people off welfare, only 10 percent of US children lived in a household where no adult worked (OECD, 1998; Dickens 
and Ellwood, 2001).   
The increase in the proportion of UK children in workless households is driven by more lone parents being workless (due partly to 
a small decline in lone parents’ employment rates, but also to an increasing propensity for lone parents not to live with other 
relatives), a rise in the number of lone parent households, and an increase in the proportion of workless couples.    
The increase in child poverty over past decades, on the other hand, is due to an increase in the incidence of poverty for all family 
types combined with an increased proportion of children in lone parent families, who have much higher poverty rates than do 
couples with children.  For example, one-quarter of all children living with two parents were in poverty in 1996/7, up from one-
tenth in 1979 (Gregg, Harkness and Machin, 1999).  Over the same period, poverty rates among children of lone parents rose 
from one in two to two in three, whilst the proportion of all children living with a lone parent rose from around one in ten to a little 
more than one in five.   
                                                   
1 Income is adjusted for household composition using the McClements scale: this uses a couple with no children as a 
reference household, and adjusts incomes of households with different compositions.  There is no agreement on what the right 
equivalence scale should be, but the UK Government and academics have used this one for over 20 years.  As is the case for 
the US poverty line, the main advantage of the McClements scale is consistency (these issues are explored further in Banks 
and Johnson, 1993).  Income is also calculated after subtracting housing costs; this helps regional comparisons and problems 
comparing expenses for homeowners and renters.  The definition used by the current UK Government is discussed later in 
this chapter.   5
Comparative studies suggest that the US has higher child poverty levels on a within-country relative income measure, but lower 
levels on an absolute measure—such as the US official poverty line—because US living standards are higher across the 
distribution.  For example, on the same relative poverty definition (50 percent of mean income before taxes and housing costs, 
adjusted for family size) the US whole-population poverty rate rose from 25 percent in 1979 to 32 percent in 1999 (Dickens and 
Ellwood, 2001), while in the UK it rose from 11 percent to 26.  But 29 percent of UK children were living on incomes below the 
US poverty line in 1995 (Bradbury and Jantti, 1999) compared with 21 percent of US children (Dalaker, 2001).  
The Impact of Deprivation on Life Chances 
Growing acceptance among UK policy makers that childhood deprivation has longer-term consequences was probably the most 
crucial factor in the assembling the political will to address childhood poverty.  That children growing up in deprived households 
and communities do less well in terms of life chances has long been documented in cross-sectional correlations, but these cannot 
establish causal links.  More recently, a literature has emerged that suggests that financial deprivation has an identifiable impact on 
educational attainment, wages, employment rates and other social outcomes in adulthood—even after controlling for child ability 
and family background (Blanden et al, 2002; Gregg and Machin, 2000a and 2000b).  
The UK literature relies mainly on the birth cohorts of the National Child Development Survey of 1958 and the British Cohort 
Study of 1970.  These surveys follow children from birth through to adulthood, giving a wider range of individual child and family 
characteristics than is common in other available evidence.  These data reveal (1) an increased intergenerational income correlation 
as income inequality rises and (2) evidence that children growing up in financially deprived households underachieved in terms of 
education, were more likely to contact with the police and probation services, and experienced higher unemployment and lower 
wages in adulthood.  Since these studies can control for a wealth of aspects of child and family background but not for residual 
unobserved family or child differences, they may somewhat overestimate the impact of financial deprivation.  A more important 
limitation is that they cannot say conclusively, since some of the studies relate to childhoods in the 1960s, whether the effects 
identified are associated with relative or absolute deprivation.  These limitations are not true of the US evidence that child-based 
interventions can make a difference to child outcomes for a range of deprived children, which was perhaps equally influential in the 
debate.  In particular, evidence that the Head Start program (Currie and Thomas, 1995) or the Abercedarian Project (Ramey and 
Ramey, 1998) made substantive differences to child development for children from low income families suggests that, whatever 
the causal origin, educational disadvantage among deprived children is malleable by policy intervention.   6
Measuring and Defining Child Poverty  
The Prime Minister’s pledge to end child poverty is a dramatic one, and appears to be deeply felt.  The Government has been 
slow to translate this formally into a specific and measurable target, however, for both institutional and intellectual reasons.  First, 
the UK has never had an official poverty definition:  welfare programmes do not have an income cut-off such as (say) 150 percent 
of the poverty line, as is common in the US.  
The closest equivalent—which is often used by academics, commentators, and, indeed, the Labour Government on occasion—is 
a relative definition of poverty, counting a household as poor when its income is below some point in the income distribution.  The 
most common definition used since 1999 has been 60 percent of median household income (adjusted for household size, and after 
subtracting housing costs).  This is similar to the European Union’s preferred indicator of poverty, which also uses 60 percent of 
the median before housing costs but different adjustment scales for household composition. 2  Measuring incomes after housing 
costs results in 4.4 million UK children (34 percent) living in relative poverty in 1996/7 (the year before Labour came to power), 
compared with 1.7 million (14 percent) when Labour last held office in 1979.  This is the single statistic most commonly used by 
the Government to describe its “inheritance”.  The 1996/7 relative poverty line corresponds (in 1996/7 prices) to annual 
disposable incomes after deducting housing costs of £8,013 and £9,458 for a couple with (respectively) one and two children; 
before deducting housing costs, the numbers are £9,225 and £10,889.  In 1996, the official US poverty standards for the 
equivalent families were £8,344 ($12,516) and £10,691 ($16,036) (see Bureau of Census, 2000).   
Using this definition, the Government set itself a short-term target to reduce child poverty by a quarter of its 1998 level by 2003 
(DWP, 2001).  But use of a poverty measure based on relative income has disadvantages that are well recognized by the 
Government.  One is that rising living standards and rising poverty rates can occur simultaneously, as indeed was the case in 
Ireland in the latter half of the 1990s.  Although these two events are mathematically completely consistent, they may well not 
accord with the politicians’ or the populace’s view of what poverty is, which may undermine the credibility of an anti-poverty 
campaign.  Another significant problem, which is true of both relative and absolute measures defined in terms of income, is that an 
income-based poverty line will show the effects of income transfer programmes almost immediately, whilst programmes to reduce 
long-term disadvantage or the damaging effects of living in a low-income household will barely register.  This is particularly 
important, given that UK policy-makers tend to think about child poverty not simply in terms of relative (or absolute) low incomes,   7
but also in terms of childhoods that can be damaging due to a sustained lack of financial resources in a household.  This anti-
poverty agenda is, thus, part of a wider “opportunity agenda” (HM Treasury, 1999a), which aims to reduce the incidence and 
severity of circumstances that have long-term adverse repercussions for individuals.   
Partly to address these issues, the Government has produced a range of “poverty” indicators since 1999 that cover relative 
incomes and absolute incomes—as well as education, health, crime, and labour market outcome incidences.  Thirteen of these are 
directly related to children (Department for Work and Pensions, 2002).  But a multitude of indicators gives no clear standard by 
which to judge when child poverty has been “abolished”.  The Government, therefore, is currently debating openly how to 
“[measure] poverty in a way that helps to target effective policies and enables the Government to be held to account for progress” 
(DWP, 2002b).  The debate is looking at four options: (1) maintaining the multi-dimensional indicators, (2) aggregating some 
subset of these into a single index, (3) focusing only on income-based measures, and (4) measuring relative low incomes and 
material deprivation simultaneously—as does the official poverty measure now adopted by the Irish government (Nolan and 
Whelan, 1996; for the theory; Callan et al, 1999; for the practice).   
The material deprivation measure is increasingly common in the European literature on poverty.  It counts people as poor if they 
lack socially perceived necessities, which might include adequate food consumption, clothing, and other basic commodities.  There 
have been a number of such studies in the UK, none of which, unfortunately, are directly comparable.  The most recent is the 
Poverty and Social Exclusion Survey (Gordon et al, 2000).  
The Strategy 
The policy response to child poverty and its consequences has three main components:  (1) raising direct financial support to 
families with children; (2) reducing worklessness in households with children; and (3) ameliorating the long-term consequences of 
child poverty. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2The main difference is that younger children are given a higher weight than in the UK McClements scales.  This places the 
child poverty rate for the UK on the EU basis half way between the before housing cost measure and the after housing cost 
measure, at about 28 percent in 1998.   8
1.  Raise direct financial support for families with children, targeted on—but not exclusive to—low-income 
families 
The most immediate and obvious response to observed low incomes in many families with children is to increase the net transfers 
available through the tax and benefit system.  Between 1997/8 and 2002/3, spending on the four main programmes that provide 
financial support for families with children is predicted to increase by 58 percent (or £7.8 billion a year, around £1,100 for each 
family with children in the UK  3).  Around a third of this increased expenditure for children has the sole goal of reducing the 
relatively low incomes experienced by the poorest children.  This child-specific support has been buttressed by increased general 
support for low earners.  A National Minimum Wage (NMW)—the first in the UK—was established in 1999.  Reforms to the 
National Insurance scheme (roughly equivalent to the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance programs in the US) lowered 
costs for low-age workers and their employers.  The starting rate of income tax was lowered from 20 to 10 percent to further 
increase take-home earnings in low-skilled entry-level jobs.   
The new child-specific resources have been delivered through both expanded tax credits and cash transfers.  The tax credits 
include the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), the associated Childcare Tax Credit, and the Children’s Tax Credit.  
Increased cash payments have come in Income Support benefit rates for children (mainly paid to workless families) and in the 
universal Child Benefit.  Although the WFTC has received more press and analytical attention than any of the other reforms aimed 
at increasing the generosity of support for families with children, this emphasis is misleading.  The changes since 1997 should be 
considered together, because they combine to form a systematic overhaul of the structure of financial transfers to the 7 million 
families and the 13 million children in the UK.  Their inter-relationship is made clear in the Government’s announced plan 
(discussed below under Future Directions) to merge all the major parts of financial support for children into a new child tax credit 
in 2003 (Inland Revenue, 2001; HM Treasury, 2002).   
Here is how the child-specific reform package differs from the programs that went before.  Before the 1998 budget, support for 
children came from four sources:  a universal per child transfer (Child Benefit) normally paid to mothers; extra payments in means-
tested benefits for those not working (Income Support or Jobseekers’ Allowance) normally paid to the family head; a refundable 
tax credit for working families (Family Credit) paid to the mother; and one of two related non-refundable tax credits available to 
                                                   
3 This estimate, in 2002 prices, is from a micro-simulation model, and includes only the cost of the changes to child benefit, 
family credit/WFTC, income support for families with children, and the children’s tax credit compared with a world where 
child support was unchanged in real terms between 1997 and 2002.  It does not count the saving from abolishing the married 
couples’ and related allowances.  Families with children will also have been affected by budgetary reforms affecting all 
families: These overall impacts are summarized in Figure 4.1 in Brewer, Clark and Goodman, 2002.   9
one taxpaying earner per family (normally the father).  Starting with the March 1998 budget, the Government has increased the 
generosity of all four of these, and all but the Child Benefit have undergone structural change.4   
Increased generosity of Child Benefit.  The 1998 and 1999 Budgets together raised the real level of Child Benefit by 27 
percent for the eldest child, with inflation-only increases for younger siblings.5  The increases in support for children in means-
tested benefits have been focused on younger children:  between April 1997 and 2002, in real terms weekly payments for children 
aged 0-4 rose by £15 a week—an 82 percent real increase—and those for children aged 11-15 rose by £6.50.  The result is that 
financial support for children up to age 15 has been equalized—older children had previously received more generous support.  
This reform partly reflects recognition by the Government that poverty rates were higher among families with younger children and 
partly facilitates the proposed move to a child tax credit, with its emphasis on simplicity and transparency.  
As in the US, Britain increasingly uses the tax administration service to target transfers to families with children.  The UK has an 
individual system of income tax with an exact with-holding system.  Credits and allowances appear in a person’s tax schedule, 
which employers then use to assess and deduct income tax directly from wage or salary payments.  Allowances are typically less 
generous than in the US, so people start paying income tax at lower annual incomes (Gale, 1997; Brewer, 2001; for more 
comparisons of the US and UK tax systems).   
Children’s Tax Credit.  This credit (which will only exist between April 2001 and April 2003, when it will be merged into the 
proposed new Child Tax Credit) is a non-refundable tax credit that replaces two mutually exclusive and equal-valued tax credits:  
the Married Couple’s Allowance (MCA) and the Additional Person’s Allowance (APA).  The overall impact is that, since 1999, 
married couples without children have lost a tax break, and families with children, regardless of their marital status, have seen a tax 
break more than double in value.  The MCA and APA were available to all taxpayers, but the Children’s Tax Credit is withdrawn 
at 6.7 percent from people paying higher rates of income tax (over £34,515 from April 2002), similar to the Child Tax Credit in 
the US.  It is doubled in value for families who have a child under 1 year old.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4 There was one cut: lone parent benefit, a small addition to child benefit for lone parents, was abolished for new claimants in 
1998.  The cost estimates presented here do not account for the consequential saving, but the Figures later on do.   
 
5Rates correct as of April 2002.  Real-terms comparisons for Child Benefit use the RPI index, other benefits use the ROSSI 
index (which is the RPI index less housing costs)    10
Working Families’ Tax Credit.  The WFTC is an evolutionary reform to the existing in-work benefit, Family Credit.  
Announced in the Labour Government’s first full budget in spring 1998 and available to claimants from October 1999, it is 
available to families with children where any adult member is working 16 hours a week or more.  It consists of a per-family 
element—the same for couples and lone parents—and per-child elements.  There is a very short flat zone where the maximum 
award is paid, and the credit is phased out beyond earnings of £94.50 a week at a rate of 55 percent of after-tax income.  For a 
person on the basic rate of income tax and paying National Insurance contributions (like payroll tax), this adds up to a total 
effective marginal tax rate of 69 percent, a rapid rate of withdrawal compared with the combined phase-out faced by Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) claimants in the US.6   
The WFTC is more generous than its predecessor, as both the family and the child elements have been increased.  For a family 
with one child, the WFTC is worth a maximum of £86.45 a week—or around $6,700 a year, substantially more than the EITC in 
the US. Each additional child raises the maximum credit by £26.45 a week.  But most of this increased generosity in the maximum 
value of the WFTC has been matched in the level of out-of-work support, and so has by itself made little difference in the financial 
gain from moving from welfare to work.  In addition, families can earn more before support is withdrawn, and the withdrawal rate 
has been lowered.  These changes have increased support for those in full-time or better-paid part-time work (i.e. earning more 
than £94.50 a week in 2002 prices) and extended eligibility for in-work support to a large number of families.   
Childcare Tax Credit.  This new refundable credit pays parents up to 70 percent of formal, registered childcare costs up to a 
(generous) maximum of £135 a week for 1 child (£200 for more than 1 child).  The Childcare Tax Credit entitlement is a 
supplement added to the credits in WFTC and is treated in the same way as WFTC in all respects. It is, however, restricted to 
households where all parents are in paid work, although lone parents have been the prime beneficiaries to date.  This represents a 
substantial increase in generosity of support for childcare costs over the regime under Family Credit, which only offered a 
childcare cost disregard rather than a direct cash payment. 
                                                   
6 In other words, for most WFTC claimants, the WFTC withdrawal adds 38 percentage points to the effective marginal tax 
rate.  This rate measures what proportion of an extra pound of income is lost to income tax and national insurance payments, 
as well as withdrawn welfare benefits and tax credits.  The higher the effective marginal tax rate, the lower the incentive to 
work for any additional earnings.   11
2.  Reduce the number of children living in workless households 
The second part of the strategy is to reduce the numbers of workless families with children.  This part of the strategy contains 
elements designed to improve the financial returns to employment, a reform of welfare administration to develop work-oriented 
case management of the welfare dependent population, and improvements in childcare opportunities. 
Reform of tax and benefits structure.  This reform, described above as increasing the direct financial support to families, is not 
neutral in its impact on the financial attractiveness of employment.  The package was deliberately slanted toward increasing the net 
gains from employment, or, in the jargon, to “making work pay”.  The specific work incentive features are two.  First, the 
maximum weekly earnings level at which withdrawal started under the old Family Credit system was £77.15.  This has increased 
by £13.70 in real terms.  Thus, earners can keep 100 percent of what they earn up to a higher earning level than before.  Second, 
the withdrawal rate was lowered from 70 percent to 55 percent of net-of-tax income, implying that less is taken out of each 
additional pound earned above the level at which withdrawal starts. 
These reforms generally increased support for full-time or better-paid part-time work.  For lower-paid, part-time lone parents, the 
improved incentives come mainly through the increased support for childcare costs in the Childcare Tax Credit. 
Case management.  The New Deal employment strategy also involves development of a case management approach to 
promoting work by welfare recipients.  This was already partially developed for those claiming unemployment-related benefits in 
the UK, but has been extended substantially under the New Deal framework.  Nearly all welfare participants are now contacted 
by a Personal Adviser to establish if they want to work or participate in a program to improve job-readiness.  The New Deal for 
Lone Parents and the New Deal for Partners are particularly relevant for families with children—groups that had previously been 
ignored in strategies to encourage employment.   
National childcare strategy.  This strategy aims to create childcare opportunities for all those wishing to use them.  Out-of-
work parents, and especially out-of-work lone parents, identify the absence of available and affordable childcare as a major 
barrier to increasing employment (Finlayson and Marsh, 1998; Shaw et al, 1996).  The essential problem appears to be that, 
given wages available to mothers, the supply price of formal childcare is too high to create demand in low- and even middle-
income areas.  The Government strategy here is to both reduce the effective cost to parents and to stimulate supply.  The 
Childcare Tax Credit described above affects the demand side by directly helping parents afford paid childcare places.  The   12
supply side of the strategy consists of a guaranteed half-day place in a pre-school for 4 year olds (run by state schools that 
provide full-time schooling for 5 to 7 year olds, and soon to be extended to 3 year olds), Early Excellence Centres, and 
Neighbourhood Childcare Centres, which provide subsidized childcare in some of the poorest communities and encouragement 
for schools or Local Authorities to run After School Clubs and holiday play schemes. 
3.  Reduce incidence and severity of scarring factors from childhood and early adulthood 
The third major arm of the strategy is to try to reduce the impact of deprivation on educational attainment, and to limit the carry-
over of social problems to adulthood.  There is a diverse range of initiatives targeted at key life-stages or events, generally 
originating from the Social Exclusion Unit attached to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998).  These 
cover teen pregnancy, children leaving social care, and homelessness among the young.  In addition, a failure to connect to stable 
employment during the teenage years has been identified as causally linked to higher unemployment and lower wages in adulthood 
(Gregg, 2001; Arulampalam, 2000).  The New Deal for Young People aims to eliminate long-term youth unemployment, and to 
improve matching with sustained employment among youth.  Chapter 6 provides details on this aspect of reducing long-term 
disadvantage.  Here we focus on those parts of the strategy directed at low educational attainment. 
On international assessments of comparable reading and math abilities among adults, the UK—along with the US—has a high 
variation in standards and a large number of adults with low levels of literacy and numeracy (Layard, McIntosh and Vignoles, 
2000).  Schools with high levels of child poverty among their pupils underachieve on school-leaving exams and generally have 
fewer pupils staying in education after the minimum leaving age of 16.  To what extent this underachievement is due to teaching 
quality or the attendant problems the children bring with them remains controversial.  Since income itself can only be partially 
responsible for this low achievement, it makes sense not only to improve incomes but also to address the education deficit directly. 
 Sure Start, school attainment in poor areas, and Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMAs) tackle this deficit from birth 
through to the end of the teenage years.   
Sure Start.  Sure Start is perhaps the most important of these initiatives so far.  Its design was loosely motivated by the US Head 
Start program (Currie and Thomas, 1995), but there are large differences in the details.  Sure Start is targeted on children aged 0 
to 4 living in the most disadvantaged communities in the country.  It aims to promote physical, social, and emotional development 
of children, and hence to make them more ready to learn by the time they enter into school.  So far Sure Start programs operate in   13
some 200 poor communities, but there are well-developed plans for expansion.  These do not always overlap with the childcare 
centres mentioned above, but overlap and co-ordination is increasing as both expand. 
Raising educational qualifications on leaving school.  Successive governments have developed an extensive series of tests to 
assess child development through the education system.  These are undertaken at ages 7, 11, and 14.  Final examinations on 
leaving secondary school (always referred to as GCSEs, which stands for General Certificates of Secondary Education) are 
undertaken at 16.  These tests are increasingly used to assess the value-added made by a school, and to highlight under-
performance.  Schools have regular inspections by Government-appointed inspection teams, and failing schools may be closed or 
have their senior teaching staff replaced.  Local Authorities are also assessed for the support structures they supply.  Again, failing 
areas m ay lose local control and be replaced by private-sector management consortia.  One of the key aims of this near-
continuous assessment regime is to raise standards of achievement amongst poorly performing pupils and schools.  This is being 
supported by extra financial resources directed at children with greater learning needs, rather than explicitly focused on poverty.  
There has been no attempt, however, to break with nationwide pay scales for teachers (which allow only for a small “London 
bonus”) to make teaching in schools serving more deprived areas more attractive to high-quality teachers. 
Educational Maintenance Allowance.  Compulsory full-time education ends at age 16, and the one third of young adults who 
cease full-time education at this point are those, unsurprisingly, with fewer qualifications and from less well-off families.  
Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMAs)—means-tested cash payments to young adults who continue in post-compulsory 
full-time education—are being piloted in a number of disadvantaged areas, and will be available nationally from 2004.  They are 
designed to raise educational participation, retention, and achievement after age 16.  Four variants are being piloted, with the 
maximum weekly payment ranging from £30 to £40 per week subject to full school attendance, plus retention bonuses each 
semester, and a final achievement bonus.  As well as the financial amounts, the variants are also testing whether it matters to whom 
in the household the payments are made. 
The evaluation strategy is to compare outcomes of young adults in areas where the EMA is available with outcomes of young 
adults in similar areas where the EMA is not available.  A matching approach based on propensity scores is used to control for 
differences in young people’s characteristics that might influence their educational outcomes.  So far, the evaluation has focused on 
whether EMAs have affected participation.  Results indicate that they increased it.  Amongst young people eligible for the full 
allowance—approximately one third of young people in the pilot areas, with gross family incomes under £13,000—participation   14
increased by around 7 percentage points.  Since the increase in participation was lower for those eligible for less than the full 
amount of EMA, the average effect over all young people eligible for some payment was an increase of around 5 percentage 
points (Ashcroft et al, 2001).  As data emerges, the evaluation will go on to assess impacts on attendance and course completion. 
What the Reform Package Has Accomplished So Far 
The reform package aims to reduce child poverty—not only through increases in child-specific financial support, but also through 
reductions in the numbers of children in workless households, particularly lone parent households.  The latter goal is to be 
achieved through reductions in marginal deduction rates and increases in the overall returns to work.  This section looks, in turn, at 
what the reform package has done to (1) numbers of children in poverty, (2) overall financial support for families with children, (3) 
marginal deduction rates and overall returns to work, and whether the incentives embodied in the reforms are, in fact, changing 
behavior —i.e., increasing employment among lone parents. 
1.  Numbers of children below the poverty line 
As of April 2002, there are two ways to analyse the impact of the reforms on incomes, and on child poverty.  Micro-simulation 
models can predict the first-round changes in incomes that should arise through the reforms, compared with a base system of no 
real changes to taxes and transfers.  The use of relatively high phase-out rates for in-work and means-tested benefits means that 
the beneficiaries from the extra money directed towards families with children since 1997 are heavily concentrated in the poorest 
households (Figure 1).  Households with children in the second and third income deciles see disposable incomes rise by over 6 
percent, whereas families in the top three deciles gain by less than 1 percent.  Of course, the general focus on children in 
successive budgets means that all these households are gaining relative to households without children. 7  
Figure 1:  Estimated income gains for families with children from increases to child support, 1997-2002 
Micro-simulations can also estimate the impact these reforms would have on child poverty.  A number of different studies of the 
impact of the reforms between April 1997 and April 2001 (a slightly different period from that used in the rest of this chapter, but 
one that corresponds to the Labour government’s first term in office) all suggest around 1.2 million children would be lifted out of 
                                                   
7These calculations do not analyse changes in the personal taxes and benefits that affect all families: This is shown in Brewer, 
Clark and Goodman (2002).  The effect of Labour’s first-term in office on family incomes overall is analysed in Clark, Myck 
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relative poverty, assuming nothing changed between April 1997 and April 2002 except taxes and benefits (Piachaud and 
Sutherland, 2001; HM Treasury, 2001; Brewer, Clark and Goodman, 2002).  This assumption is, of course, unrealistic.  It is also 
potentially misleading, given that the UK Government has explicitly accepted that its notion of child poverty is a relative one and 
real incomes are generally rising.  A better way, then, to assess the impact of the reforms on child poverty is to use actual data on 
the changing distribution of incomes.  The latest official data cover the 2000/1 financial year, and show that the number of children 
poverty had fallen by 0.5 million since 1996/7.8  Between 1996/7 and 2000/1, the poverty line grew by some 10 percent in real 
terms:  if we disregard this, and merely count the number of children in 2000/1 in households below the 1996/7 poverty line (fixed 
in real terms like the US Census Bureau’s poverty thresholds are), then child poverty would have fallen by 1.3 million, or 30 
percent, in just 4 years.  
The changing shape of the income distribution for children is shown in Figure 2.  As can be seen, the increased generosity of the 
package is helping to raise incomes of the poorest families with children in real terms.  It is also moving the large spike in the 
income distribution of children closer toward the relative poverty line, although it has so far has pushed only a small minority of 
children across this line.  This shows how hard large reductions in relative poverty are to achieve.  On a more encouraging note, 
real incomes of the poorest fifth of children are rising rapidly for the first time in twenty years.  If the spike continues to move to the 
right faster than the poverty line, the impact on relative poverty will be greater.  
Figure 2:  The changing real income distribution for children in low-income households 
2.  Increased financial support to low-income families with children 
As noted above, the reform package includes four major programs designed to increase the disposable incomes of families with 
children:  the Children’s Tax Credit; the WFTC; a higher level of Income Support; and a more generous Child Benefit.  The effect 
of these changes is compared with the situation before reform in Figure 3.  Panel A of the figure shows the total cash support 
available for a live-alone parent with two children under 11 under the pre-reform (1997) support package.  Panel B shows the 
total support available to the same stylised family post-reform (as of April 2002).  (A figure for couples with children would be 
identical except for the income support payments, which would be higher in both cases).  The figures do not show the impact of 
the generous Childcare Tax Credit, because it is difficult to choose a single value of childcare costs that is plausible throughout the 
                                                   
8 Analysis of data covering the last 6 months of 2000/1 – which fully captures the large increase in children’s allowances in 
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indicated income range:  This omission makes the reformed system appear less generous than it is to those working but on a low 
income and with some formal childcare costs. 
Figure 3:  Total financial support by gross income, before and after reform 
The real world impact is always more complicated than these sorts of charts imply.  In particular, the Figure does not capture all 
the potential interactions between welfare programmes and tax credits.  The two programmes of concern are Housing Benefit, 
which supports low-income households with rental costs (owner-occupiers normally get no housing support), and rebates against 
local taxes, known as Council Tax Benefit.  Both of these benefits are withdrawn as income rises, but crucially—unlike the EITC 
in the US—WFTC awards count as income when calculating awards of these benefits.  There are two implications for families 
with children with relatively high rents or local taxes.  First, the extra generosity of WFTC awards over Family Credit may be 
largely offset in smaller HB and CTB awards.  Second, such families will also be on multiple benefit withdrawals with effective 
marginal tax rates of over 70 percent.  In fact, the introduction of the WFTC has substantially reduced the number of households 
who are in work but facing effective marginal tax rates over 70 percent (as shown in Table 1 in the next subsection).  The large 
number of families with children where no adult works are much more likely to be claiming Housing Benefit than those currently in 
work, and hence the impact of the WFTC on the incentive to work 16 or more hours remains muted by its interaction with 
Housing Benefit. 
How does this situation compare with its US counterpart, the EITC?  This question is particularly appropriate given Chancellor 
Gordon Brown’s assertion, when the UK Government first announced that it was interested in reforming in-work support, that it 
would examine “the advantages of introducing a new in-work tax credit for low-paid workers…  [and] would draw upon the 
successful experience of the American earned income tax credit, which helps reduce in-work poverty” (Hansard, 2 July 1997).  
Even now, there is a strong political resonance between the WFTC and the EITC:  In the words of the respective political leaders 
in the late 1990s, both support “hard-working families” and “reduce child poverty”.   
A direct financial comparison between the WFTC and the EITC (Brewer, 2001) suggests that the UK system is substantially 
more generous.  But this comparison can be misleading, because the WFTC reduces entitlements to other benefits whereas the 
EITC represents truly additional income.  What is less often realized is that the structure and administrative details of the WFTC 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2002); the official source is DWP, (2002e).  There were some relatively small increases in child support in financial 2001, 
that are not captured by this data.   17
(following its predecessor, Family Credit) are also quite different from the EITC.  Although the tax authority in the UK (the Inland 
Revenue) administers the system, the WFTC has little direct connection to the rest of the tax system, unlike the EITC, and does 
not operate as an annual tax rebate.  Instead, it is paid either directly through the wage packet, or fortnightly, if it is paid to a non-
working individual whose partner satisfies the work condition.  For new jobs, the size of the award is assessed on expected 
weekly earnings.  For claimants with stable jobs, it is calculated by looking at the past four pay cheques (seven if paid weekly) and 
then paid at the same rate for six months, regardless of changes in income.  
This desire to get money to claimants quickly—rather than waiting for the end of the tax year—is primarily motivated by two 
concerns.  First, most taxpayers in the UK have their income tax correctly withheld by employers, and only the rich, the self-
employed, and those with complex tax affairs file a tax return.  Second, people entering work on low wages would be worse off in 
work without the WFTC, because of the relatively high level of out-of-work benefits compared to the US.  This means that the 
“real-time” work incentives of the WFTC are stronger than those provided by the EITC (Walker and Wiseman, 1997). 
Of course, the WFTC and the EITC are not the only ways that the UK and US governments support families with children.  In 
both countries, children are recognized in the benefit system by in-work refundable credits and by non-refundable tax credits or 
extra tax deductions or allowances.  However, the vagaries of perception and political economy mean that these support systems 
are often presented from very different perspectives, making them difficult to compare.   
In Figure 4 we summarize the two systems by comparing the full annual budget constraint—the relationship between gross income 
and income of taxes and benefits and welfare payments—for a live-alone lone parent with children in the UK in 1997 and 2002 
with that in the US in 2001.  The UK’s system of financial support for children was broadly in line with that in US at lower 
incomes prior to the current reforms, but the reforms have made it substantially more generous.  It is also more redistributive 
among families with children, with higher net tax rates at higher incomes than the US.  The US system has been necessarily 
simplified:  These figures do not include state taxes, state EITCs or Medicaid; we include Food Stamps; and we have assumed the 
TANF system operating in Florida, a relatively low-benefit state (Committee on Ways and Means, 2000, p 384).  Housing 
support and help with childcare costs are ignored in both countries.   
Figure 4:  Disposable income after welfare and tax payments, by gross income, UK before and after reform, and US in 
2001   18
Figure 4 gives a representation of the total budget.  Figure 5 shows the supports specifically dependent on children, by calculating 
the cash difference in the budget constraints of a single person and a live-alone lone parent with 2 children.9  In the UK (Panel B), 
financial support for children falls in cash terms as income rises, apart from the short phasing in of the non-refundable children’s tax 
credit.  This is not true in the US.  First, the phase-in of the EITC gives a range where support increases with income at the lowest 
incomes.  Second, after the EITC has been phased out, the value of the child exemptions and the head of household filing status 
increase with income.  A striking feature of the US system is the trough after the EITC has been withdrawn and before the tax 
allowances and deductions increase in value (from around $50,000), discussed more in Ellwood and Liebman (2000).  
Figure 5:  Financial support for children, by gross income, UK and US 
3.  Marginal deduction rates and overall incentives to work 
Marginal deduction rates for working families have changed as a result of the WFTC reform.  The reduction in the headline phase-
out rate from 70 percent to 55 percent and the fall in the number of families entitled to rent support have reduced the number of 
families on very high marginal deduction rates.  But the increased generosity of WFTC has increased the number of families on 
some form of benefit phase-out.  Before the WFTC was introduced, around 750,000 households had marginal deduction rates of 
over 70 percent, and 130,000 had rates over 90 percent (Table 1 shows these as 8.4 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively of all 
employees with children).  The WFTC reduced these numbers to 250,000 (4.3 percent) and 30,000 (1.4 percent), respectively, 
but the numbers on marginal deduction rates of 60 percent or more rose by nearly 200,000, to just under a million.  This may be 
an acceptable trade-off.  However, if the WFTC continues to expand further up the income distribution, the terms of the tradeoff 
will rapidly deteriorate.10   
Table 1:  Distribution of marginal deduction rates faced by employees with children before and after reforms 
The rates in Table 1 are above those typically found in the US because of the higher phase-out rates used in the UK.  But work 
incentives are not universally worse in the UK, because a large discontinuity in the budget constraint in the UK makes families 
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person and 3-person household.  The same applies for the UK.  This is the approach used by Ellwood and Liebman (2000), 
who look at the tax treatment of US families with children, and in Battle and Mendelson (2001), who compare systems of 
support in the UK, US, Australia and Canada.   19
become eligible for WFTC at 16 hours work a week.  In fact, both countries seem to have good financial incentives for lone 
parents to do some work—assuming full take-up of all entitled benefits—but poorer incentives for lone parents to increase 
earnings beyond part-time or minimum-wage jobs (Brewer, 2001). 
With respect to improving incentives to work more generally, the WFTC (including the Childcare Tax Credit) and the Children’s 
Tax Credit combine to increase the financial returns to working rather than being on welfare.  The intention is to induce entry into 
work, and so further reduce child poverty.  This is because a reduction in the number of children wholly or nearly-wholly 
supported by the state is probably vital if the numbers in child poverty—given the use of a relative definition—are to be reduced.  
We look first at the gain to taking a job and then the effect of increasing earnings once in work. 
Table 2 shows how the reforms have altered the financial gain to work—the difference in zero-income position on benefits and in-
work income after taxes and benefits—for some benchmark families.  (These calculations ignore in-work costs, but our focus on 
change in the gain to work minimises the impact of this omission.)  The reforms have slightly improved the financial gain to work at 
16 hours a week, but have had more of an impact on the incentive to do full-time work, particularly for lone parents (first row).  
For the first earner in a couple, the full-time minimum wage work (second row).  The values for a single person (3rd row) show 
that the reform package has had very little impact on those without children. 
Table 2:  The effect of the reforms on the financial gain to work for parents with children 
The other rows show variations on this theme.  Because it is withdrawn as income rises, housing benefit typically dulls the financial 
incentive to work, and it also reduces the increase in the cash gain to work brought about by the WFTC (compare rows 4 with 1, 
5 with 2 and 6 with 3).  Working in the other direction, though, the Childcare Tax Credit produces a large improvement in the (net 
of childcare costs) gain from moving to work for a lone parent paying £50 a week for childcare (7th row of table; £50 a week 
childcare costs is slightly higher than the average of those currently claiming the Childcare Tax Credit).  The negative aspect of the 
reforms is that entry into work by a second adult in a family where the primary worker earns £300 a week (the last row in the 
table) has seen a sharp drop in the financial incentive.  Such a person had the highest return to full or part-time employment in 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Table 1 assumes full participation in all income-related transfer programmes.  This is a fair assumption for income support, 
where participation rates amongst eligibles is over 95 percent, but for family credit and WFTC, where participation rates are 
lower (72 percent and 62 percent, respectively, measured, respectively, in summer 1999 and summer 2000).  Sources: 
WFTC take-up rates from McKay (2002), FC take-up rates from Marsh et al (2001).  Take-up rates of other means-tested 
benefits from Department of Work and Pensions (2001b).    20
1997, but in the 2001 scenario has some of the lowest financial gains to employment (the first wage in this stylized two-earner 
family is sufficient to get the family off Housing Benefit, so housing tenure makes no substantial impact here). 
There has been a debate in the UK as to whether these changes in financial incentives will cause people to change their behaviour. 
 Blundell et al (2000), simulate the impact of the introduction of the WFTC (so they compared the WFTC system of October 
1999 to the system in April 1999) using a structural labour supply model.  They predict that the WFTC will reduce workless 
households with children by just under 60,000 (affecting around 100,000 children).  They also suggest that there will be some 
offsetting reduction of labour supply by women with working husbands.11  The UK Government’s estimates are that the total 
package of reforms will encourage around 80,000 extra parents to enter work, a little more than twice the estimate in Blundell et 
al (2000) for the WFTC alone (HMT, 2000b).  These estimates use elasticities derived from data on labour market transitions 
using the methodology laid out in Gregg et al (1999).  Comparisons for the WFTC alone suggest the two methodologies give very 
similar results (Blundell and Reed, 2000).   
4.  Lone parents’ employment change: Early evidence  
The WFTC has been in operation for thirty months now, and the first evidence of its impact is beginning to emerge.  As of 
November 2001, there were 1.3 million claims for WFTC—430,000 more than for its predecessor in summer 1999—whilst the 
numbers of children covered by these claims rose by 870,000 (see Table 3).  The numbers of children of lone parents supported 
by the WFTC was 1.1 million in November 2001, over 400,000 more than under the previous regime.  So, by November 2001 
the numbers supported through in-work tax credits was almost equal to those supported by out-of-work welfare payments.  
However, the numbers of children for whom support through in-work tax credits were claimed was also rising prior to 1999, 
especially among single parents.  These numbers do not necessarily imply falling out-of-work welfare dependency.  But the 
number of children for whom out-of-work welfare payments are claimed has itself fallen, by around 730,000 since the peak at the 
end of 1995, with children of lone parents accounting for nearly half of this fall (290,000).   
Table 3:  Numbers of children for whom payments are made by type of welfare benefit and tax credit, 1995-2001 
So, there has been a sustained decline in the number of children supported by welfare payments and this was well established 
prior to the advent of WFTC.  Amongst lone parents, though, the rate of decline has been faster since August 1999 (the last date   21
prior to the advent of the WFTC) than before, and faster than the decline in the number of children in all families claiming out-of-
work benefits since the summer of 1999 (DWP, 2002d; and earlier editions).  These differences are encouraging on their face.  
But since they are modest and take no account of changing population demographics or the state of the economic cycle, they yield 
no clear conclusion about the impact of the WFTC.  
In search of a more definitive conclusion, Table 4 explores the evidence for lone parents more formally, using a simple difference 
in difference methodology.  Lone parents in the UK have long had very low employment rates.  From the mid 1980s to the early 
1990s, employment rates for lone mothers were broadly stable at just above 40 percent, even though over the same period, 
employment among mothers with working husbands rose sharply (Desai et al., 1999; Blundell and Hoynes, 2001).  But in 1993 
the employment of lone parents started to rise. Table 4 compares the annual changes in this rate for 1996-1999 (before the advent 
of WFTC) and 1999-2001 (after its introduction).  Splitting the data in this way (see the raw annual changes in column 2 of Table 
4) supports the suggestion in the administrative caseload data of Table 3 of a modest increase in the rate of growth of lone parent 
employment post-1999, although the difference between the two periods is not statistically significant. 
Table 4:  Annual changes in employment rates among live-alone lone parents, 1996-99 and 1999-2001 
In any case, raw differences do not take account of the strong employment recovery over the last few years in the UK, which 
slowed after 1999 and stopped entirely in 2001.  To account for the state of the economic cycle and the differing performance of 
different age and skill groups in the recovery, we compared the raw changes in column 2 of Table 4 with those of single (live-
alone) adults without children of similar age and education—a natural comparison group as they were unaffected by the policy shift 
and have similar household circumstances apart from the presence of children.  We also adjusted for differences in age of the 
children of the lone parents. The results are shown in column 3 of Table 4.   
The difference between the pre- and post-reform periods is more marked, and on the borderline of statistical significance.  These 
results suggest that the buoyant labour market drove the bulk of the improving employment rates of lone parents between 1996 
and 1999.  They also suggest, however, that since 1999 there has been an acceleration in employment growth for lone parents 
that is higher than employment growth among childless individuals with similar characteristics.  Hence, it tentatively appears that 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 The authors have benchmarked this model against labor supply estimates derived from past reforms to in-work benefits in 
the UK (Blundell, 2000 reviews this evidence) and believe it to be consistent.     22
lone parents have had an exceptional increase in employment rates over this period, which could reflect a behavioural response to 
the financial incentives and other aspects of welfare reform since 1999.  
Future Directions 
All three of the main areas of policy development described earlier—raising direct financial support for families with children, 
reducing the numbers of workless households, and mitigating the scarring factors of childhood deprivation—are continuing to 
develop.  Two current policy proposals in particular—for expanded case management and greater system integration—would 
profoundly change the picture of the UK welfare system. 
Job Centre Plus, and the Expansion of Case Management in the Welfare System 
Job Centre Plus is a tag used by the Government to describe the unification of administration systems for different out-of-work 
working-age benefits.  In practice, this means that, over time, all benefit claimants will get regular contact with a personal advisor 
(case manager), with the frequency of the contact depending on the specific benefit.  Under the New Deal programmes this has 
been compulsory for the unemployed but voluntary for disabled workers and lone parents.  This is in the process of changing.  In 
the future all claimants will have a compulsory “work-focused interview” at regular intervals, with a personal advisor asking about 
a person’s desire to work and the inhibiting factors.  Claimant groups will have different job-search requirements, but similar 
support systems will be available to all, whatever benefit they are on, if they want them.   
This reform places work at the heart of the welfare administration process for all groups, whereas in the past the unemployed were 
clearly given a higher priority for job placement efforts.  It also means that benefit advisors will not have implicit incentives to push 
people onto other benefits.  All groups will have readily available job-search support systems.  The case management will not just 
help with job search, but will cover issues of transition in the benefit system and access to care services for dependants as well.   
This development follows from the New Deal framework of contacting a wide range of benefit groups to discuss, promote, and 
support a transition into employment (see Chapter 6 for discussion).  The main difference is that it will be embedded routinely in 
the benefit administration and attending the “work focused interview” will be compulsory.  It falls a long way short, though, of 
compulsory job search or time limits on welfare receipt.      23
Integration of Child Support Payments 
The integration of all child support payments is another unifying reform, but one affecting the tax and benefit system rather than the 
administration regime.  The aim is to pull together all the financial support for children (outlined in Figure 5 earlier in the chapter) 
that is currently paid through welfare payments, in-work benefits and tax credits into a single instrument, with the same rules and 
administration.  This proposed Child Tax Credit has many more similarities with the Canadian Child Tax Benefit than with the US 
system.  It will remain nominally distinct from the universal Child Benefit, but in most practical terms—such as who receives the 
payment, and how it is paid—the two will be identical.  Payments in respect of adults in Income Support and the WFTC will 
remain outside this system.  And, at the same time as the switch to the child tax credit, in-work support will be extended to adults 
without children (with restrictions to full-time employment and a minimum age of 25) in something called the Working Tax Credit.  
There will be few immediate changes in family incomes as a result of the child tax credit: the emphasis is on a structural change to 
how payments to families with children are delivered, rather than how much is paid. 12  The new features are as follows.  First, all 
payments in respect of children will be paid to the mother or the main care-giver.  Under the current system, who gets the payment 
depends on which benefit is being paid and even how the payment is being made.  Second, income uncertainty at the time of 
transitions into and out of work will be reduced.  This is because there will be a stable platform of financial support for children 
across the welfare-to-work divide, rather than the uncertainly (and possible delay) of moving from out-of-work benefits to in-
work benefits.  Third, as almost all families will be able to receive some support, take-up rates for the Child Tax Credit may be 
substantially higher than for the WFTC.  Fourth, payments will be assessed against family income throughout.  This represents the 
most significant step towards joint assessment for families with children since income tax became individualized in 1990.   
Although the new tax credits will notionally depend upon annual income, they will not be a retrospective annual system like the 
EITC.  The aim is to operate an annual system (and so minimise hassle for families whose circumstances are stable) but also to 
provide some protection for families whose income falls.  In practice, this means that awards will depend upon either the previous 
fiscal year’s annual income or expected annual income in the current fiscal year.  A novel feature is that year-on-year income rise 
of under £2,500 will be ignored by the tax credit system.  The impact of this, which will lower the short-run effective marginal tax 
                                                   
12 Writing some time before the final details had been announced, some authors noted that a unified and integrated child tax 
credit would require either benefit increases for families on out-of-work benefits or benefit cuts for those on in-work benefits 
(see Brewer, Myck and Reed, 2001): in the end, the Government chose the former and phased these in gradually in the years 
leading up to the new tax credits so that most families with children will see almost no change in incomes in April 2003 (the 
main exceptions are better-off families with children, some of whom will qualify for the child tax credit but not the children’s 
tax credit, and some the other way round).    24
rates for some families with children, is hard to predict (Inland Revenue, 2001; HM Treasury, 2002; for the development of 
official policy; Brewer, Clark and Myck, 2001; for more details of the background to the reform).  
Conclusion and Assessment 
While the UK Government’s strategy contains many of the main elements of US welfare to work agenda—such as increased 
financial incentives and case management of the welfare caseload to support transition into work—it also has substantial 
differences.  The most striking factors that are different in the UK are: 
•  Levels of welfare support for those not in work—as well as those in work—are rising substantially.  
•  There is no time limiting of welfare support or requirement to seek work for lone mothers.  (Sanctions                    
   only apply to those claiming unemployment benefits who do not meet their responsibilities to look for       
  work and accept appropriate job offers.) 
•  There is a strong emphasis on tackling poverty and its consequences for children. 
The objectives which underlie welfare development in the UK are primarily the economic circumstances for families with children 
and the outcomes achieved by the poorest of those children.  Reducing welfare rolls and reducing expenditure are clearly 
secondary priorities.  Hence, from a British perspective, welfare to work is a policy success if and only if it results in reduced 
deprivation for the child.  It is also clear that the reform process is far from over.  The second round of reform currently underway 
has been more about the structures of welfare systems and caseload management than payment generosity, although support levels 
are still rising.  This reflects in part the difficulty of quick implementation of fundamental reform to institutions.  
Whilst the objective in general is clear, the more specific target is not.  At some stage the government will have to declare its 
position on what it means by elimination of child poverty.  Elimination of poverty on a high relative income measure is almost 
impossible.  The most successful European Union countries (Sweden, Denmark and Norway) have child poverty rates (on a 50 
percent of mean income before housing costs basis) of a little under 5 percent (Bradbury and Janie, 1999).  Measurement error 
and lumpiness of income over the short windows commonly used to assess income in the UK data will always leave some people 
below such a benchmark.  The longer term financial position may be a better guide to the financial situation that actually matters to 
children’s well-being and development.    25
The Government has a number of sensible ways forward.  It could assert that such imprecise data means that an estimated child 
relative poverty rate of 5 percent—or higher—is consistent with its intention to eliminate child poverty.  Alternatively it could focus 
on the measurement of material deprivation or some combination of a relative income and material deprivation measure, as used 
by the Irish government.  A reliance on relative income will require large resources to be committed to supporting children, and 
child support systems to rise in line with median incomes thereafter.  This is difficult but not impossible.  Indeed one crucial new 
announcement in the April 2002 Budget was that the per child payments in the new child tax credit will be automatically linked to 
earnings rather than prices, ensuring the relative value of these payments.  It is clear from Government publications, however, that 
the intended target is larger than a simple financial measure.  As a result, it is likely that the measures ultimately adopted to assess 
success will include some indicators of material well-being.   
The strategy is clear, however, even if the target is not.  The Government has substantially raised financial support for families with 
children.  Increased payments have been focused on low-income families, whether or not they are working, but all families with 
children have gained something under the Government’s package of reforms.  Work incentives have risen, especially for full-time 
work, and those lifted out of poverty to date are much more likely to be working.  Increasing the financial rewards for work at low 
wages is part of a wider strategy to reduce the number of children living in workless households.  This part of the strategy would 
appear vital if the costs of eliminating childhood poverty are not to prove prohibitive.  Here there are some early signs of 
improvement, with the number of children in workless households down from 19.4 percent in 1996 to 15.3 percent in spring 
2001.  There have also been substantial reforms to the way welfare is administered to support transitions into work.  The most 
important is the development of a case management approach, with all claimants having a personal advisor.  The final part of the 
strategy is to reduce the extent to which children from the poorest households and communities underachieve in terms of 
development and education.  This involves a mixture of extra resources and focusing the machinery of government and service 
delivery on out-turns among the poorest children.  All elements of this strategy are evolving, and further steps have already been 
announced or proposed.  
The intention is commendable, and the strategy coherent, but the scale of the task so large that many argue it is unachievable.  
Some cynics even suggest the Government has little intention of achieving it.  The central problem is maintaining political and public 
support for the large financial transfers required to reduce poverty on a relative income basis, especially if recent reductions in 
worklessness do not continue.  The increased work incentives are certainly not substantial enough alone to drastically reduce the 
numbers in such workless households; hence the strategy relies heavily on the reforms to welfare administration and increased   26
childcare availability to facilitate moves back to work.  Increased generosity of support in and out of work may actually reduce the 
desire for work, as life without work becomes more tolerable at these higher income levels. Increased generosity of support will 
also mean that the high withdrawal rates cover an ever-expanding section of the population.  This could be reduced by greater use 
of the universal, or near universal, parts of the child support system, but at a large extra cost.   
In addition, there are problems in establishing exactly what the impacts of financial resources are on child development outcomes, 
and even more problems in designing and implementing successful interventions.  In mainstream policy areas, Britain has not 
developed as strong an experimental and evaluation culture as the US.  Nor has it developed systematic mechanisms by which 
evidence can influence policy delivery on the ground.  This becomes all the more difficult where policy allows for significant local 
inputs and choices.  On a more up-beat note, if interventions and reduced financial distress lead to fewer people with very low 
levels of literacy, for example, then fewer parents in the next generation will suffer as acute problems earning and supporting their 
families.  This intergenerational transmission aspect of deprivation is very important in government thinking.  
The ambition of this program will be perhaps surprise American readers, and it seems unlikely to us that such ambition would be 
ever attempted in the US.  It is interesting, however, to think about whether it should be and what form supporting federal and 
state policy might take. 
This work forms part of the research programme of the ESRC-funded Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public 
Policy at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Centre for Market and Public Organisation at the University of Bristol.  
The authors are grateful to Tom Clark for comments and advice.  Labour Force Survey data was made available by the 
Office for National Statistics through the ESRC Data Archive, and is used with permission of the Controller of Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office; Family Resources Survey data was used with permission of the Department of Work and 
Pensions.  Neither of those institutions bear responsibility for the results presented here.    27
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Table 1.  Distribution of marginal deduction rates faced by employees with children before and after the reforms 
Percentage of Employees with Children 
Marginal Deduction Rate 
1997-8  2002/3 
more than 100%   0.1  0.0 
more than 90%   3.7  1.4 
more than 80%   4.7  3.9 
more than 70%   8.4  4.3 
more than 60%   8.9  15.4 
more than 50%   8.9  19.1 
more than 40%   27.3  30.9 
more than 30%   73.2  80.4 
more than 20%   91.6  89.7 
more than 10%  94.0  92.2 
more than 0%  94.4  92.4 
All  100  100 
 
Notes:  A marginal deduction rate is the percentage of the marginal pound of earnings that is lost in taxes and withdrawn benefits or tax credits.  Calculations are performed on employees only, assuming 
full participation in all means-tested benefits and tax credits.  1997/8 values calculated using FRS 1997/8 and the tax and benefit system as of April 1997; 2002/3 figures estimated using FRS 1999/0 
with earnings adjusted for two years of average growth, and the tax and benefit system as of April 2002.  There were around 7.5 million employees with children in both years. 
   32
Table 2.  The effect of the reforms on the financial gain to work for parents with children 
Gain to work (£) 
16 hours  35 hours 
 
1997  2001  1997  2001 
Not on HB:         
Lone parent  63  71  107  130 
Primary earner in a couple with 
children  26  50  79  99 
Single person, no children  13  13  72  79 
         
With HB:         
Lone parent  43  43  65  80 
Primary earner in a couple with 
children  20  21  42  49 
Single person, no children  2  8  2  31 
         
With childcare of £50/week when 
in work:         
Lone parent  13  56  92  115 
Second earner in a couple with 
children:         
No childcare costs, first earner on 
£300 a week 
67  30  127  93 
Notes:  Table measures difference between zero-income benefit income and income after taxes and benefits in work. Assumes 2 children under 11 and full take-up of all entitled benefits, hourly wage of 
£4.20, rent of £50 a week where indicates, in-work childcare costs of £50 a week where indicated (slightly more than the average of those lone parents currently claiming the Childcare Tax Credit).  All 
values expressed in 2002 prices.   
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on TAXBEN model.   33
Table 3:  Numbers of children for whom payments are made by type of welfare benefit and tax credit, 1995-2001 
 
Number of Children (thousands) 
 
Nov 95  Nov 96  Nov 97  Nov 98  Aug 99  Nov 99  Nov 00  Nov 01 
Welfare Benefits for Workless Families  
Unemployed  633  510  382  341  325  298  251  201 
Sick & disabled  628  633  656  646  658  649  666  671 
Lone parents  1,884  1,853  1,795  1,718  1,731  1,704  1,643  1,593 
Other  111  93  90  83  77  78  66  61 
Total  3256  3089  2923  2788  2797  2729  2626  2526 
Tax Credits for Working Families  
Family Credit  WFTC   
Nov 95  Nov 96  Nov 97  Nov 98  Aug 99  Nov 99  Nov 00  Nov 01 
Couple  788  882  901  885  871  1000  1208  1330 
Single  450  520  580  647  663  761  935  1071 
Total  1238  1402  1481  1532  1534  1761  2143  2401 
Note:  The Working Families Tax Credit replaced Family Credit in October 1999.  
Source: Office for National Statistics (2001).   
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Table 4:  Annual changes in employment rates among live-alone lone parents, 1996-99 and 1999-2001 
Period  Raw Annual Changes 
Adjusted to control for parenthood 
and age of youngest child 
1996-1999  1.82  0.16 
1999-2001  2.40  1.20 
Difference  0.58  1.04 
Note:  Column 3 is the difference in employment growth rates between comparable lone parents and single adults with in the two periods. They have been estimated from probit equations of 
employment status controlling for year, age 18-24, 25-34, 35-44 (45+ as the base), qualifications of degree level or equivalent, a level but below degree, O level or equivalent and below O level (the 
base).  Gender and gender and age, qualification interactions and interactions of gender, age and qualifications with time are also included. As are dummies for age of youngest child being 0-1, 2-4, 5-10 
and 11+ (5-10 as the base) which are not interacted with time.  The marginal effects reported are the transformed coefficients on a year/lone parent interaction for the two periods.  
Source:  Labour Force Survey.   35


















































Notes:  Income deciles are derived by dividing all families (with and without children) into 10 equally sized groups according to income adjusted for family size using the McClements equivalence scale.  
This graph shows the effect on families with children only.  For example, the reforms will increase incomes of working-age families with children in the poorest tenth of the population by 4.7 percent.  
Assumes full participation in all income-related transfer programmes.  
Source: The IFS tax and benefit model, TAXBEN, based on 1999/00 Family Resources Survey.   36
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Source: from Brewer, Clark and Goodman, 2002, and calculated using data from Family Resources Survey. 
Note: Figure shows estimated distribution of equivalised weekly disposable household income for children in households below £400/wk (in 2000/1 prices).  The proportion of children living in such 
households was respectively 88% and 84% in 1996/7 and 2000/1; 60 percent of median income on this definition was, respectively, £139 and £153 in 1996/7 and 2000/1. 
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Figure 3:  Total financial support by gross income, before and after reform 


































































Note: Assumes live-alone lone parent, 2 children under 11, no housing costs or childcare costs. Entitlement for WFTC reached at £3,400, or 16 hours 
work/week at the minimum wage. Values uprated to April 2002 prices.  38

































































Note: Assumes live-alone lone parent, 2 children under 11, no housing costs or childcare costs. Entitlement for WFTC reached at £3,400, or 16 hours 
work/week at the minimum wage. Values uprated to April 2002 prices.
(Figure 3, Continued)  39
 
Figure 4:  Disposable income after welfare and tax payments, by gross 
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Note: Assumes live-alone lone parent, 2 children under 11. Does not include housing or childcare support or costs.   40
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Note: Assumes live-alone lone parent, 2 children under 11. Entitlement for WFTC reached at £3,400, or 16 hours work/week at the minimum wage. 
Values uprated to April 2002 prices.
(Figure 5, Continued) 